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I. INTRODUCTION
Inscribed in the highly visible fagade of the Supreme Court building is the
caption "Equal Justice Under the Law." This inscription, which assures that
every citizen is dealt equal justice, embodies the guiding principle of our
society and judiciary. The responsibility of ensuring that equality is delivered
in our courts are the Justices and judges who pledge to perform their duties
impartially, free of personal interest or bias.' As public officials, judges
J.D. Candidate, May 2001, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 1998, Washington
University. The author wishes to thank the Honorable Judge William Hoeveler of the United States District
Court, Southern District of Florida, for his insightful commentary and guidance regarding this comment,
and especially his parents, family, and friends for their support.
I See Jeffrey M. Shaman & Julie R. Fouts, The Impact of Judicial Relationships on the
Appearance of Impartiality, JUD. CONDucr REP., Winter 1990, at 1.
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exercise judicial discretion over a diversified range of issues both in public
and private sectors affecting "every facet of life" and influencing "every
corner of society."2 Judges are considered by most citizens as symbols of
justice, consistently striving to impartially balance the scales of justice
providing an even playing field for all.3
An impartial judiciary is essential to immortalize justice and to preserve
the public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.4 Judges should
not be persuaded by personal bias or prejudice concerning particular litigants
or by a personal stake in the outcome of a proceeding. In order to suppress the
presence of partiality and safeguard "independence and accountability,"5 state
and federal forums regulate judicial disqualification through statutes and
Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct.6 These codes intend to foster
public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system and "sustain the rule
of law and constitutional and democratic values" of our society.7
Nevertheless, it is evident in today's society that citizens have been losing
confidence in the ability of the law and the courts to dispense equal justice for
all.' Under attack from political and media scrutiny, the judiciary has been the
focus of contemptuous criticism.9 From scandals surrounding judicial
campaign financing"0 to criticism of Supreme Court Justice Breyer upon his
nomination to the Court," the public is alarmed by pervasive impropriety
within the judiciary. This criticism initiated discussion about whether current
federal judicial disqualification statutes and the Code of Judicial Conduct are
adequate scriptures compelling judges to be ethical and avoid the appearance
of impropriety.
This Comment examines the injustice within the judicial process as a
result of substandard specifications for judicial disqualification. The
Comment describes the historical development leading up to the present
2 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Ethics, GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS, Summer 1988, at 1.
3 See Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L REv. 625,646 (1999).
4 See Jeremy S. Brumbelow, Liteky v. United States: The Extrajudicial Source Doctrine and Its
Implications For Judicial Disqualification, 48 ARK. L REV. 1059, 1059 (1995).
S T RESPONSIBLE JUDGE: READINS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS 278 (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth
I. Winston eds., 1993).
6 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3E (1990).
See Zenrans, supra note 3, at 632.
9 See Roberta S. Mitchell, The Founding of Capital's Law Review: A Retrospective, 25 CAP. U.
L REv. 237,241 (1996).
9 See Zemans, supra note 3, at 637.
10 See Alexander Wohl, Justicefor Rent, AMERICAN PROSPECT, May 22, 2000, available at 2000
WL 4739281. I
1 See Stanley A. Kurzban, Legality, Ethicality and Propriety of Justice Breyer's Participation
in United States v. Ottati & Goss, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 139, 139-40 (1996).
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statutory standards for recusal" and then discusses the federal statutes which
are deficient in providing for judicial disqualification, specifically focusing
on the disqualification of federal judges with financial or other interests in the
outcome of a proceeding. The Comment then concludes by evaluating the
inherent problem in the particular federal provisions in light of current case
law and recommends a solution to curb the potential for injustice.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
In England, during the era of William Blackstone,judicial disqualification
was invalidated as a means of protecting the judicial process from judges'
biases.'2 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England represented a
significant shift from the English tradition of utilizing recusal to substitute a
suspect judge with a detached replacement. a Instead, Blackstone adhered to
the view that judges and people should tolerate the suspicion of partiality
within the courts." According to Blackstone, "the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption
and idea."'" Notwithstanding Blackstone's beliefs, under early English
common law disqualification was necessary when the judge had a direct
economic interest in the outcome. 6
B. Constitutional Grounds for Disqualification
The Constitution instituted an independent judiciary with decisional
independence to guarantee that all individual cases were decided impartially.' 7
As a result, "the problem of judicial disqualification is of constitutional
dimensions."'" The Constitution warrants that every citizen will receive an
1 See, e.g., Litekyv. United States, 510 U.S. 540,543-44(1994); see also Brumbelowsupra note
4, at 1064.
13 See William de Ralegh & Henri de Bracton, The Laws and Customs of England (1270), in THE
RESPONSIBLE JUDGE: READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICs 278-279 (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth I. Winston
eds., 1993).
14 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), in THE RESPONSIBLE
JUDGE: READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS 278, 279 (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth L Winston eds., 1993).
is Id.
16 See Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REv. 736,
751 (1973).
17 See Zemans, supra note 3, at 630-31.
Is Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1064.
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impartial trial before a "neutral and detached judge"' 9 under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2' The Due Process Clause
entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and
criminal cases.2 This powerful and independent constitutional interest in a
fair adjudicative proceeding helps guarantee that life, liberty, or property will
not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts
or the law.22 At the same time, this constitutional interest preserves both the
appearance and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done."23 Justice ensures that no
person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in
which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not
predisposed to find against him.24
The Supreme Court has jealously guarded the "requirement of
neutrality"2 under the Due Process Clause safeguarding "the purity of the
judicial process and its institutions."26 No person can be a judge in his own
case and no person is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome.2" The Court has demanded that "justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice."2 Thus, every procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average person as a judge not toehold the balance between the State and
the accused denies the latter due process of law, even though the judge may
have no actual bias and may be capable of weighing the scales of justice
equally between contending parties.29 Therefore, constitutional law mandates
that due process is violated when a judge has "the slightest pecuniary
interest. '
19 See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) ("Petitioner is entitled to a
neutral and detached judge."); see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1064.
2 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V, § 1 ("No person shall be... deprived of fife, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."); U.S. CONsT. amend. XlV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."); see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1064.
21 See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at
1065.
2 See Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242; see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1065.
23 Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
172 (1951)); see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1065.
7A See Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242; see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1065.
25 See Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242; see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1065.
2 Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 437,439-40 (5th Cir. 1968); see also
Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1065.
27 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
29 Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
9 See Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
30 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,524 (1927); see also Davis v. Xerox, 811 F.2d 1293, 1294 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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C. American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct
The American Bar Association adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics in
1924 to provide a model of conduct rather than an enforceable code." The
thirty-six canons that consisted of generalized standards of proscribed conduct
were drafted by a committee headed by Chief Justice William Howard Taft
and have been criticized for emphasis on "moral posturing. ,32 Failing in
concrete strictures, the Canons of Judicial Ethics were deficient in solving
complex questions.33 As a result, the American Bar Association created a
Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct to compose
contemporary authoritative regulations.34
In 1972, the American Bar Association adopted the Code of Judicial
Conduct5 that, contrary to its predecessor, contains five compulsory and
enforceable canons. 36 Through minor changes in 1982 and 1984 and a
revision in 1990, the Code, generally and specifically, calls upon judges to
"observe high standards of conduct. '37 The Code demands thatjudges uphold
the integrity and independence of the judiciary, avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities, perform the duties of their
office impartially and diligently,, and minimize the risk of conflict with
judicial obligations when engaging in extra-judicial activities.3
The Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instrumental in dictating
a uniform model code of ethics that federal and state judges must observe.
Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judiciary have
adopted the Model Code either in its entirety or in part.39 Consequently, the
Code forms the "foundation for a national body of law concerning judicial
conduct and a uniform standard to be followed in each jurisdiction."
4
Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct addresses judicial
disqualification. The section provides:
31 See Shaman, supra note 2, at 3.
32 Shaman, supra note 2, at 3 (quoting Robert McKay, Judges, the Code ofJudicial Conduct, and
Nonjudicial Activities, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 391, 391).
33 See Shaman, supra note 2, at 3.
34 See id
35 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
36 See Shaman, supra note 2, at 3.
37 Steven Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 987 (1984).
38 See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-5 (1990).
39 See Shaman, supra note 2, at 3.
40 Id
2000]
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(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,
or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the
matter, or the judge has been a material witness
concerning it;
(c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a
fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever
residing, or any other member of the judge's family
residing in the judge's household, has an economic
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding;
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director,
or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de
minimis interest that could be substantially affected
by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding."
The general test of disqualification contained in Canon 3E confers that the
judge must disqualify himself if the "reasonable man, were he to know all the
circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." '42 The
Code intends to maintain the appearance of impartiality throughout the
judiciary by ensuring that no reasonable person will suspect that a biased
41 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucT Canon 3E (1990) (footnotes omitted).
42 Note, supra note 16, at 745.
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judge will participate in a proceeding.43 The Canon also requires judicial
disqualification in specific instances where a judge's impartiality may be
questioned.' Furthermore, parties are allowed to waive disqualification under
Canon 3F, where the disclosure of any basis for recusal was not a result of
personal bias or prejudice concerning either party.45
In revising the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990, the American Bar
Association added two important provisions regarding judicial disqualification
in the commentary to the Code. First, the American Bar Association added
that judges disclose "on the record information that the judge believes the
parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge does not personally feel that the information
implies that recusal is necessary."'  Second, the American Bar Association
further enumerated that "ownership in a mutual... investment fund that holds
securities is not an economic interest in such securities unless the judge
participates in the management of the fund or a proceeding pending or
impending before the judge could substantially affect the value of the
interest." '47 These provisions were attached to elevate public trust and
confidence in the judiciary by guarding the appearance of justice while
simultaneously preventing excessive disqualification and judge shopping
within the judicial process.
D. Federal Standards for Judicial Disqualification
In order to foster public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system
and preserve the constitutional and democratic values of our society, Congress
has legislated statutes delineating conditions under which a federal judge must
disqualify himself.48 Federal Statutes originating in' 1792 have compelled
district judges to recuse themselves when they have an interest in the suit, or
have been counsel to a party in the proceeding.49 When utilized, the statutes
mandate that "no man can lawfully sit as a judge in a cause in which he may
have a pecuniary interest, [and as a result,] [a]ny interest .... however small,
has been held sufficient to render ajudge incompetent."50 Congress expanded
43 See id.
44 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990).
4 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F (1990).
46 MODELCODEOFJUDICiALCONDUCr Canon 3E (1990); see also Kurzban, supra note 11, at 154.
47 MODELCODEOFJUDIClALCONDUCrCanon 3E (1990); see also Kurzban, supra note 11, at 154.
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1993); see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1065.
49 See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994).
so THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE: READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS 280 (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth
L Winston eds., 1993) (quoting Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 340 (1816)).
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the recusal statutes in 1821 to include all judicial relationships or connections
with a party that would in the judge's opinion make it improper to sit."
Congress reacted to evolving societal concerns by enacting three separate
recusal statutes containing broader and more stringent standards governing the
disqualification of federal judges. Seeking to exclude federal judges from
hearing an appeal from the decision of any case, over which the judge
presided as a trial judge, Congress, in 1891, passed 28 U.S.C. § 47.52 The
statute guarantees that federal appellate judges will not be predisposed by the
opinions or decisions arrived at in the trial court either by colleagues or
themselves.53
The second statute Congress adopted regarding recusal occurred in 1911.
The provision, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144, allows litigants to disqualify a
district courtjudge from a proceeding because of personal bias or prejudice."
The provision currently reads as follows:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files
a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter
is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in
favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and reasons for the belief that bias
or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than 10 days before the
beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good
cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party
may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied
by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good
faith. 55
As presently applied, the statute requires that each party file an affidavit
in good faith stating with particularity the facts and reasons supporting the
party's allegations that bias or prejudice exist.56 Conclusory allegations
without substantiated facts to support such accusations are not sufficient to
51 See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 544.
52 See Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1066-67.
53 See id.
54 See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1993); see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1067.
55 28 U.S.C. § 144.
56 See i; see also Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22,33 (1941); Brumbelow, supra note 4, at
1068; Karen Nelson Moore, Appellate Review ofJudicial Disqualification Decisions in the Federal Courts,
35 HASTINGS L. J. 829, 831-32 (1984).
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disqualify a judge." Further, the litigant must file the affidavit in a timely
manner and with "reasonable diligence." 8
However, the statute is limited in its application since each party may file
only one affidavit in a given case and the statute only applies in federal district
courts.59 The statute's effectiveness is further diminished because it is
ultimately the judge's decision to disqualify himself.6 Even if a party proffers
a sufficient affidavit demonstrating the existence of bias or prejudice to
warrant recusal, the judge has the authority to scrutinize the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit and deny the litigant's motion.6 Therefore, Congress' attempt
at securing judicial impartiality was not served with the implementation of 28
U.S.C. § 144.
In 1974, Congress modified a third recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, in
response to the personal involvement provision that positioned judges "on the
hors of a dilemma." 2 The previous recusal statute was introduced in 1970
to revise the 1792 act and provided that:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel,
is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with
any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.63
Congress drastically overhauled this statute to reach all members of the
federal judiciary and articulated with specificity the level of involvement
necessary to warrant judicial disqualification." The newly reworked statute
provides as follows:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following
circumstances:
See Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1068.
Id at 1068-69.
'9 See 28 U.S.C. § 144; see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1067-68.
60 See Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1069.
61 See i.
62 United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 232-33 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Moore, supra note 56,
at 832; Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1070.
63 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
"A See Moore, supra note 56, at 832-33; see also Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1070.
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(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in
the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom
he previously practiced law served during such
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or
the judge or such lawyer has been a material
witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental
employment and in such capacity participated as
counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the proceeding or expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular case in
controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary,
or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest
that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding. 65
Currently, "the basic provision on disqualification of federal judges,"' 28
U.S.C. § 455, delineates two grounds for disqualification. First, the law
prescribes that a judge must disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which
'5 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1993).
66 Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1070.
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his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." '67 This element of the statute
establishes an objective test requiring recusal "when an objective,
disinterested observer fully informed of the facts under which recusal was
sought would entertain significant doubt that justice would be done in the
particular case."68 However, the parties are allowed to waive disqualification
if the record contains the basis for recusal.6 9 Second, the statute asserts
grounds for mandatory disqualification when one of five specific
circumstances exists.7" When circumstances call for mandatory recusal,
waiver is not permitted and may not be accepted by a judge.7' Litigants, who
move for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and support their motions with
affidavits, memoranda, or other factual statements, still must rely heavily upon
the judge who is the target of the motion.72
In revising 28 U.S.C. § 455, Congress sought to achieve uniformity
between the statute and the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial
Conduct, and preserve the public confidence in the administration of justice
and the integrity of the judicial process." Further, Congress attempted to
"clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualification" to assure the
nation that the judiciary operated impartially.74
III. SPECIFIC GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNPER 28
U.S.C. § 455
A. 28U.S.C. §455
Congress intended 28 U.S.C. § 455 to conform generally to the American
Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct in an effort to increase public
confidence in the impartiality of federal judges while simultaneously
maintaining the efficient administration of justice. In adopting language
verbatim from the Code of Judicial Conduct, Congress attempted to revise the
statute in light of the legal and ethical considerations contemplated by the
Advisory Committee on the Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of
the United States. However, specific provisions within the statute, when
67 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
68 Kurzban, supra note 11, at 150 (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Serv., Inc., 782
F.2d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1993).
70 See id. § 455(b).
71 See id § 455(e).
72 See Brumbelow, supra note 4, at 1072-73.
73 See id at 1075-76.
74 See IUljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988)).
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applied to specific facts or circumstances, raise ethically questionable
judgments. The Advisory Committee emphasizes that ethical considerations
oblige a judge to assess "possible and potential conflicts of interest as well as
actual conflicts of interest. ' 75 The following provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455
have significant shortcomings that allow judges to act unethically when
presented with situations that question the judge's impartiality.
1. APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY: 28 U.S.C. § 455(A)
Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code is a "catch-all
recusal" provision requiring disqualification in any proceeding in which the
judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."76 This provision
directs that all grounds for recusal, including but not limited to both "interest
and relationship" and "bias or prejudice" grounds, be "evaluated on an
objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but
its appearance., 77 Thus, the law instructs a court to determine "whether a
reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about
the judge's impartiality. 78  Accordingly, if an "objective, disinterested
observer fully informed of the facts under which recusal was sought would
entertain significant doubt that justice would be done in the particular case,"
the judge must disqualify himself "to avoid even the appearance of partiality
... [even though]... no actual partiality exists.
' 79
Congress adopted this provision from the Code of Judicial Conduct "to
promote public confidence in the impartiality of thejudicial process by saying,
in effect, if there is a reasonable factual basis for judging the judge's
impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over
the case."'8 However, there are limitations in its application. First, under §
455(e) any basis for disqualification brought under § 455(a) may be waived
by the parties as long as the record reflects the grounds for disqualification.81
Second, even though judges must disqualify themselves if a reasonable person
might question their impartiality under § 455(a), there must be a reasonable
5 In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Utig, 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (D. Ariz. 1981).
76 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
77 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).
7s Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d347,351 (10thCir. 1995); seealso Brumbelow, supranote4, at 1073-
74; Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 Neb. L.
Rev. 1046, 1048 (1993).
7 Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351.
so Kurzban, supra note 11, at 150 (quoting Steven Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 983, 986 (1984)).
81 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).
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basis for such disqualification. 2 Thus, courts have interpreted § 455(a) to
favor judicial retention rather than disqualification even where there is a hint
of potential impropriety as a result of a "remote, contingent, or speculative
interest.""
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Liljeberg
v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.," to ascertain whether the district judge
should have disqualified himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) as a trustee of a
university, which possessed an interest in the proceeding. Federal District
Judge Robert Collins presided over the trial in which Health Services
Acquisition Corporation brought an action against John Liljeberg, Jr., seeking
a declaration of ownership of a corporation known as St. Jude Hospital. 5
Prior to trial, Judge Collins, as a member of the Board of Trustees of Loyola
University,86 regularly attended meetings that discussed Liljeberg's
negotiations with the University to purchase a parcel of land from Loyola
University for use as a hospital site and to re-zone Loyola's adjoining land.87
The meetings stressed that Loyola's potential benefits, the proceeds from the
real estate sale and a substantial increase in the value of the re-zoned adjoining
land, were contingent upon Liljeberg obtaining a certificate of need.8 At the
same time Liljeberg was negotiating with Loyola, he reached an agreement in
principle with Hospital Affiliates International transferring St. Jude Hospital
to Health Services Acquisition Corporation. 9 This conflict gave rise to the
declaratory judgement lawsuit that Judge Collins presided over." Since,
Loyola University was an interested non-party, the Supreme Court held that
Judge Collins, as a trustee of Loyola University, violated 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
for failing to disqualify himself because an objective observer would have
doubted Judge Collins impartiality.91
In re Placid Oil Co.,' exemplifies a case in which the interest was too
remote, speculative, and contingent to create the appearance of partiality and
require disqualification under § 455(a). Petitioners filed an action against
twenty-three banks seeking damages, declaratory relief, and reformation and
recission of credit agreements based on malfeasance, which include
82 See Kurzban, supra note 11, at 150.
83 Id. at 150-52.
486 U.S. 847 (1988).
85 See id. at 850.
96 See id at 853 n.3.
87 See id. at 853.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 854-55.
91 See id.
802 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986).
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inequitable conduct, breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, and antitrust
violations.93 As a result of discovering that the district judge had a substantial
investment in a non-party bank that potentially would be affected by the
outcome of the proceeding, the petitioners moved to recuse the district judge
on the grounds that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.94 Upon
the judge's rejection of the motion and a filing of a writ of mandamus, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the district judge's interest in the case
was too remote, contingent, and speculative to require disqualification. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting the resucal statute, concluded
that the interest did not create a situation in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.95
2. FINANCIAL INTEREST: 28 U.S.C. § 455(B)(4)
Section 455(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code enumerates with
specificity additional circumstances requiring judicial disqualification.'
Specifically, § 455(b)(4) provides for judicial disqualification because of a
financial interest held by the judge, the judge's spouse or minor child living
at home, or because such persons have another interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.97 The provision
provides the following:
(b) [Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States] shall also
disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome. of
the proceeding98
In devising this particular clause, Congress intended to address the public
concern that a "judge's direct economic or financial interest, even though
93 See id. at 786.
94 See id.
95 See id at 786-87.
96 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (1993).
9 See id.; see also United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1982).
98 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
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relatively small, in the outcome of the case may well be inconsistent with due
process.""
Congress, therefore, established three instances in § 455(b)(4) that would
result in a violation of due process if the judge was not disqualified from the
proceeding: (1) the judge has a financial interest "in a party to the
proceeding," (2) the judge has a financial interest in the "subject matter in
controversy," or (3) the judge has "any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.""' Congress
identified in the clause two types of disqualifying interests, a financial interest
and any other interest.°10 The statute defines a financial interest as "ownership
of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director,
adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party."'0 2 Ownership in
a mutual or common investment fund or an office in an educational, religious,
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a financial interest for
purposes of this statute." 3 This provision requires disqualification no matter
how minuscule the financial interest and regardless of whether or not the
interest actually creates an appearance of impropriety. " However, a remote,
contingent, or speculative interest is not a disqualifying financial interest
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).'0 5
The per se disqualification rule for a financial interest was subjected to
criticism as a result of its rigid application. Critics argued that this section
required judges to be substituted midstream upon discovering a financial
interest. This wasted judicial time and energy and imposed a substantial
burden on the judicial process.' 6 Congress responded to the complaints by
amending § 455 with a provision that eliminates the need for disqualification
if substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter and the justice,
judge, magistrate, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may
be, divests himself or herself of the interest that generates the grounds for
disqualification."°
99 Abramson, supra note 78, at 1070.
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4); see also Abramson, supra note 78, at 1070.
101 See 28 U.S.C.§ 455(b)(4).
102 Id.
103 See id. § 455(d)(4)(i)-(ii).
104 See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860-61; see also 32 AM. JUR. 2D What Constitutes a Financial
Interest § 145 (1995).
105 See Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1998).
106 See In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust litig., 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (D. Ariz. 1981).
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(f).
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a. Financial Interest in a Party to this Action
Title 28, Section 455(b)(4), which requires a judge to disqualify himself
if he possesses "a financial interest in a party to the proceeding,""1 8 mandates
recusal no matter how insubstantial the financial interest and regardless of
whether or not the interest actually creates an appearance of bias."° In order
to apply this as a basis of judicial disqualification, the presiding judge, his
spouse, or any minor children living in the judge's household must have
ownership of a "legal or equitable interest," however small, or have a
relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a
party."
0
In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation,1 ' illustrates the "financial
interest in a party" section of the statute, holding that a district judge must
disqualify himself when he has knowledge that his spouse owned shares of
stock in several members of the plaintiff class."I The district court further
mentioned that even though the wife possessed an inconsequential financial
interest in a party, the judge must still automatically recuse himself despite the
illogical nature of such an act."3
b. Financial Interest in the Subject Matter in Controversy
When ajudge has a financial interest in a non-party, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4)
requires the court to ask whether the judge has a "financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy.""' 4 However, Congress has provided limited
guidance on how courts should interpret "subject matter in controversy.""' 5
When evaluating whether a judge has a "financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy," numerous courts have examined how direct an effect
the litigation before it will have on the interested non-party." 6 These courts
hold that "the effect of a favorable ruling must be direct, rather than indirect,
to Id. § 455(b)(4).
109 See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860-61; see also 32 AM. JUR. 2D What Constitutes a Financial
Interest § 145 (1995).
110 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4).
11 15 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Ariz. 1981).
112 See id. at 1077.
13 See id. at 1082.
114 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
115 Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D.N.M. 1989).
116 See McCann v. Communications Design Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1535, 1541 (D. Conn. 1991); see
also Sollenbarger, 706 F. Supp. at 781; In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783,786-87 (5th Cit. 1986).
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speculative, or remote," to establish grounds for recusal under the test." 7
Another court relied on Webster's Dictionary to construe "subject matter in
controversy" to mean "the matter acted upon", "the matter presented for
consideration," or "the topic of dispute in a legal matter.""' 8 Several
commentators identify that the nexus between the litigation before the court
and the court's financial interest is the principal element in the "subject matter
in controversy" inquiry." 9
Exemplifying the judiciary's application of the "subject matter in
controversy" inquiry, the United States District Court of New Mexico in
Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., determined
that the court's financial interest in four non-party corporations were directly
linked to the litigation triggering disqualification under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(4).' 20  In Sollenbarger, the litigation concerned a plan of
reorganization that divested a telephone system into separate entities
allocating to each post-divestiture entity a proportionate share of the system's
consolidated debt and equity, and providing that the companies share in the
contingent liabilities on the same basis. 2 1 Telephone customers subsequently
filed an action against one of the companies alleging that all phone customers
in New Mexico had invalid inside wire maintenance service contracts due to
antitrust violations that began prior to divestiture. 122 As a result of the
presiding judge's financial interest in four post divestiture companies, the
court held that the plan of organization provided a direct nexus between the
court's financial interest and the litigation, requiring judicial disqualification
because the court had a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy. 
23
Contrary to the result in Sollenbarger, the Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals in Department of Energy v. Brimmer, 124 and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in In re Placid Oil Co., 125 held that the judge's interest in non-party
corporations did not amount to a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy. In Brimmer, the judge owned stock in energy companies that
participated in the same entitlement program as the plaintiff.26 However, the
117 See id.
M United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Sollenbarger, 706 F. Supp.
at 781.
19 See Sollenbarger, 706 F. Supp. at 781.
12 See id at 782.
121 See id. at 778.
122 See id. at 777.
123 See id. at 782.
124 673 F.2d 1287 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982).
125 802 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986).
12 See Brimmer, 673 F.2d at 1289-90.
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court ruled that since his financial interest would not be directly affected by
the outcome of the case, he did not have a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy.'27 Similar to Brimmer, the court in In re Placid Oil Co.
held that where the judge invested in twenty-three non-party banks in the state
the potential effect on the banking industry of the state as a result of his ruling
was an indirect and speculative interest not covered by the recusal statute. 128
c. Any Other Interest
Whereas the first provision of § 455(b)(4) requires judicial
disqualification for any financial interest, however small, the second provision
requires recusal if a judge has "any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding."' 29 Although the concept of
substantiality is undefined, courts have suggested that the outcome of this test
should "depend on the interaction of two variables: the remoteness of the
interest and its extent or degree. '""3° Thus, in regard to "any other interest":
If the interest strongly resembles a direct interest-for example, stock
held in a subsidiary (or parent) of the corporate party-any amount
should disqualify, just as does any stock held in the party itself. As
the interest becomes less direct, such as that in an enterprise carrying
on business with the party, only if the extent of the interest is itself
substantial can the judge's impartiality reasonably be questioned.' 3
In applying this analysis to specific facts, courts have reasoned that
interests relinquishing small, indirect, potential benefits, which are
categorized as "any other interest" under the statute, are not grounds for
disqualification.
A case illustrating the application of the "any other interest" test under the
second provision of §455(b)(4) is Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Sasser. 132 In Sasser,
the defendant appealed a default judgment in an action that alleged that he
illegally altered, brokered, purchased and sold frequent flyer tickets.'33 The
defendant filed a motion to recuse the three appellate judges on the ground
27 See id at 1293-95.
12 See In re Placid, 802 F.2d at 786-87.
129 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1993).
130 Alaska Oil Co. v. Alaska, 45 B.R. 358,361 (D. Ak. 1985); see also Note, supra note 16, at 752-
54.
13 Note, supra note 16, at 753.
132 127 F.3d 1296 (llthCir. 1997).
"3 See id. at 1297.
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that thejudges have personal accounts in the Delta Frequent Flyer Program."3
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the judges' interests in their
personal frequent flyer accounts could not substantially affect the outcome of
this case because the issue presented in the case focused on an individual's
misconduct regarding frequent flyer awards rather than the viability of the
frequent flyer program. 1
35
In Alaska Oil Co. v. Alaska,136 the United States District Court of Alaska
held that appellate judge's entitlement to the Alaska permanent fund dividend
as an Alaskan resident was not an interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceedings, requiring disqualification from hearing the
appeal.137 In Alaska Oil Co., the primary issue on appeal centered on a
contractual dispute between Alaska Oil Company and the State of Alaska
where Alaska alleged that it was entitled to receive "in kind" royalties under
its North Slope mineral leases with Alaska Oil Company. 38 Alaska Oil
Company filed a motion to recuse the appellate judge because any income the
state might recover in this action would be deposited in the state's permanent
fund, and thus, distributed to all Alaska residents, including the resident
federal judges, as a permanent fund dividend.'39 The court reasoned that since
the extent of the interest is insignificant and the decision would not directly
increase or decrease the permanent fund revenues, the judge's interest would
not be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."'
IV. THE PRESENCE OF INJUSTICE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
A. Public Perception
In response to pressing ethical and legal issues concerning the presence
of corruption and impropriety within the judiciary, Congress enacted 28
U.S.C. § 455."i' An event igniting the legislation occurred after Nixon
nominated Clement Haynsworth to the United States Supreme Court in 1969.
The nation was outraged upon discovering that Clement Haynsworth had
presided over two civil cases that involved subsidiaries of companies in which
13 See id.
135 See id. at 1298.
136 Alaska Oil Co. v. Alaska, 45 B.K. 358 (D. Ak. 1985).
137 See id. at 362.
138 See id. at 359-60.
139 See id.
140 See id at 362.
141 See Joe Stephens, Judicial Ethics Law Contains Few Loopholes, THE KAN. CrrY STAR, Apr.
5, 1998, at A12.
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he was a substantial stockholder." 2 As a result, the Senate rejected his
nomination to the Supreme Court believing that it was imperative for him to
disqualify himself from proceedings in which he had a conflict in interest.1
43
The federal judiciary and several individual judges continue to be "the
focus of derisive commentary.""' More recently, the nomination of Justice
Stephen G. Breyer to the United States Supreme Court provoked a great deal
of controversy and dissension in the nation because of his involvement in
eight environmental cases concerning toxic waste removal. 4 The cause of
concern originated from the fact that Justice Breyer did not disqualify himself
even though his judgment in those cases may have had an indirect effect on
his investment in a syndicated fund of Lloyd's of London, which insured
waste-disposers against risks that materialized from such clean-ups and
exposed him to liability that could potentially amount to one million dollars. "
This event caused public confidence in the judiciary to wane and underscored
the deficiencies within 28 U.S.C. § 455.
B. Deficiencies Within 28 U.S.C. § 455
An exhaustive investigation and analysis of the events that transpired
regarding Justice Breyer's failure to disqualify himself in United States v.
Ottati & Goss,147 one of the eight environmental cases, concluded that Justice
Breyer legally presided over Ottati & Goss, under 28 U.S.C. § 455. 148
However, the analysis asserted that Justice Breyer' s decision to remain on the
case and not recuse himself was ethically questionable and unjust.
149
Accordingly, the results of the investigation are indicative of 28 U.S.C.
§ 455's, inability to sustain the constitutional and democratic values of our
society. The statute neglects to comply with both the constitutional principle
that every citizen of the United States will receive an impartial trial before a
neutral and detached judge and the Supreme Court mandate that "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice."' 50
In order to appreciate the significance of this argument, a full
understanding of Ottati & Goss is necessary. In Ottati & Goss, the
142 See Note, supra note 16, at 736-37.
143 See id.
I" Zemans, supra note 3, at 637.
145 See Kurzban, supra note 11, at 139-40.
14 See id.
147 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
I" See Kurzban, supra note 11, at 162.
149 See id.
0SO Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appealed a district court's refusal to
issue, unmodified, an injunction forcing a defendant to pay $9.3 million to the
EPA for costs it had incurred in cleaning up a toxic-waste site. 151  The
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act and
the Administrative Procedure Act advised the EPA to order and compel
companies disposing of toxic waste to clean up and remove the waste if the
actual threatened release of a hazardous substance from a site posed an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare of the
environment or reimburse the EPA for costs it sustains in its effort to clean up
the toxic waste site. 152 The legislation further provided that the EPA may seek
an injunction to recover costs and that the courts set aside agency actions,
findings, and conclusions only upon a finding of action that is arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 3 The laws forced companies to acquire
insurance policies in order to insure themselves against a mandated clean
up. 154
At the time of rendering a decision in Ottati & Goss, Justice Breyer was
an investor in an insurance fund that incurred liability from cases involving
environmental pollution.' As a result of the environmental legislation, he
was at a substantial risk of losing his investment in the insurance fund as well
as exposure for personal liabilitites for up to $1 million in penalties imposed
by the EPA.'56 With full knowledge of his potential conflict, then Chief Judge
Breyer, writing for the First Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed the district
court's ruling, holding that the courts need not apply the lenient, arbitrary and
capricious standard to injunctions the EPA sought against defendants such as
Ottati & Goss, but were free to make their own determinations of fact and to
exercise their own judgment in fashioning relief. 57 According to Democratic
Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, the Ottati & Goss decision advanced
the interests of polluters and insurers by bringing about less hazardous waste-
cleanup and weaker clean-up standards. 5 '
In scrutinizing the legality of Justice Breyer' s decision not to disqualify
himself in Ottati & Goss, the analysis revealed that under 28 U.S.C. § 455,
Justice Breyer neither generated the appearance of partiality nor maintained
a financial interest in a party, a financial interest in the subject matter in




155 See Kurzban, supra note 11, at 143.
156 See id.
"S See Ottati & Goss, 900 F.2d at 445; see also Kurzban, supra note 11, at 146.
Iss See Kurzban, supra note 11, at 146.
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controversy, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding requiring his recusal.'59 When confronted with the
implication that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, Justice
Breyer defended himself by applying a two-prong test to a rule that on its face
appears only to require that an objective disinterested person, knowing all the
relevant facts would suspect the appearance of partiality."6 However, Justice
Breyer found comfort in the fact that the courts in interpreting § 455(a) favor
judicial retention rather than disqualification where there is a hint of potential
impropriety as a result of a "remote, contingent, or speculative interest. 1 61
Since his investment in a syndicated insurance fund was an interest that was
not "direct, proximate, or inherent in the instant event," Justice Breyer
concluded that he had no reasonable basis to disqualify himself.62
This biased line of thinking in the judicial system perpetuates because of
the loose language in § 455(a). Certainly any judge given the option to stay
on a case or recuse himself will take the line of least resistance and remain on
the case. Thus, courts have interpreted into the statute a reasonable basis test
that excludes any "remote, contingent, or speculative interest" from becoming
a disqualifying interest.6 3 As a result, the statute, as it currently stands, defies
the constitutional principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice."'" The legislative intent in creating a "catch all provision" in § 455(a)
was to instill public confidence in the judiciary. Appellate courts continue to
"rubber stamp" abuses of judicial discretion by not requiring ajudge to recuse
himself when he has an indirect interest that would cause a reasonable person
to question his impartiality.
Justice Breyer's position on the subject is a prime example of the bench
attitude regarding recusal. Critics suggested that Justice Breyer should have
disqualified himself since he had a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy pursuant to § 455(b)(4). Justice Breyer defended himself by
applying the court favored direct effect test, which requires disqualification
only if a favorable ruling will have a direct effect on the judge's non-party
financial interest." Since Justice Breyer's favorable ruling could only have
1S9 See id at 155-60.
160 Id. at 150-53.
161 Id.
162 See id
163 See id; see also In re Placid Oil Co, 802 F.2d 783, 786-87 (5th Cir. 1986).
16 Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
165 See McCann v. Communications Design Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1535, 1541 (D. Conn. 1991); see
also Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776, 781 (D.N.M. 1989); In re Placid
Oil Co., 802 F.2d at 786-87.
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an "indirect, speculative, or remote" effect on his financial interest, he did not
have a disqualifying financial interest in the subject matter in controversy.'
In the absence of any congressional action, the courts in defining the
"subject matter in controversy" clause have repeatedly instituted a test
favoring judicial retention. The lack of instructive guidance allows subjective,
random, and arbitrary results when a party attempts to disqualify a judge
creating pervasive impropriety within the judiciary. The court's ability to
narrowly construe the statute only to interests directly affected by the outcome
of the proceeding, authorizes judges who harness a potential bias as a result
of an indirect interest to preside over a proceeding. The ability of the courts
to negotiate the law to yield judicial retention rather than judicial
disqualification taints the bench.
Another glaring defect arose as a result of Justice Breyer's failure to
follow 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), and disqualify himself since he maintained an
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
Justice Breyer claimed that his interest was not sufficiently substantial to
sustain a charge that he violated the disqualification statute. 167 He applied the
court suggested test comprising of two variables, the remoteness of his interest
and its extent or degree, determining that his interest in the syndicated
investment fund was immaterial to the outcome of the proceeding. 6" He
acknowledged that even though his investment was extremely volatile as a
result of the current legislation, it was too isolated to be sufficiently
substantial under § 455(b)(4), to compel his disqualification.'69
The third provision of § 455(b)(4) is intended to disqualify a judge with
any interest that could be substantially affected. Congress neglected to define
"substantial," subjecting it to the courts' interpretation. Consequently, courts
are fostering judicial retention rather than recusal under the principle that
every judge has a duty to sit and bolster their decision by rationalizing that
judicial efficiency is crucial to the judicial process. However, this
interpretation compromises the integrity of the judicial system by exchanging
impartiality for efficiency.
Based on some of the caselaw that has been recited in this paper, it is clear
that the courts are taking liberties for the sake of judicial expediency by
retaining judges on cases which demand removal due to bias or an appearance
of partiality. This intrusion of injustice on the bench will continue because of
the promiscuous language in § 455. Consequently, the "judicial
disqualification standards are not uniformly [applied] and . . . self-
16 See Kurzban, supra note 11, at 150-53.
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disqualification appears to be subjective, random, and arbitrary."' 70 The only
adequate way to limit the wide latitude of discretion traditionally cloaked
around a judge is to change the language in the statute.
C. Legal but not Ethical, a Solution to the Problem
Under current judicial disqualification standards, Justice Breyer's actions
may not have ascended to the level of illegality, but judicial ethics were
breached.171 "If ajudge sits on a case even tangentially touching a matter that
could cost him all his assets [it] is bound to affect him at least consciously.'
7
W
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Justice Benjamin Cardozo referenced
this sensation stating that "we may try to see things as objectively as we
please. Nonetheless, we can never see them with any eyes except our own."'
73
Thus, Congress must prevent judges from taking advantage of their positions
in the judiciary to advance economic, political, social, or other interests and
protect against the appearance of partiality.
In constructing specific provisions of § 455, Congress failed to provide
sufficiently detailed and concrete standards creating an opportunity forjudges
to circumvent judicial disqualification and adjudicate a case even if they hold
bias for or against a party. Congress must readdress judicial disqualification
and modify § 455 to "inspire trust and confidence, and ... bring honor to the
judiciary.' ' 7  Accordingly, the projected § 455 must hold "judges . . . to
higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other
persons not invested with the public trust," and require judges to "exercise
their judicial functions with integrity, impartiality, and independence. '"'7
After analyzing the opinions offered by the appellate courts when called
upon to affirm or reverse "recusal denials," the courts almost uniformly favor
affirmation of retention to avoid judicial inefficiency and reports of judicial
misconduct. As a result of the court taking liberties in the interpretation of
§ 455, these discouraging results are consistently developed. Modifying the
statute to include strict, concise, and unambiguous language would abate
17 Shirley S. Abrahamson, Commentary on Jeffrey M. Shaman's The Impartial Judge: Detachment
or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL 1,. REV. 633, 645 (1996).
171 See Kurzban, supra note 11, at 139.
172 Id. at 159-160.
173 John T. Noonan, Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law (1976) (quoting Benjamin Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process), reprinted in THE RESPONSmiLE JUDGE: READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS 22,
28 (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth 1. Winston eds., 1993).
174 Shaman, supra note 2, at 2.
17S Id. at 1-2.
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further creative interpretation of judicial interest or disinterest in a matter
before the court.
The following is offered as a possible solution:
28 U.S.C. § 455. Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate
(a) Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
...ight ... a....... be u ..ti [is in good faith questioned by
any party to the proceeding. An affidavit of good faith shall be
filed with the court.]
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following. circumstances:
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a
[direct or indirect] financial interest in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantialy affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. once stated that:
[E]qual justice is not merely a caption on the faiade of the Supreme
Court Building, [rather,] it is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our
society. It is one of the ends for which our entire legal system exists
. . . [and] it is fundamental that justice should be the same in
substance and availability. 176
The existence of this precept and the integrity of the judicial process are in
dire risk as a result of the emerging impropriety within the judiciary. "If the
public is to maintain the grant of authority to the courts, they must be
perceived as legitimate institutions playing their appropriate role in our system
of government."' 77
As symbols of justice, judges must be competent and ethical and their
actions must foster respect for the judicial process in the citizens that grant
them their power. 7 ' Further, judges should refrain from using their inherent
176 Victoria A. Roberts, Equal Justice For All: How Do We Achieve It?, 76 MICH. B.J. 256, 258
(1997).
17 Zemans, supra note 3, at 642.
'79 See Shaman, supra note 2, at 1.
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powers to undermine confidence. It is the responsibility of Congress to devise
judicial disqualification standards that are absolute when expounding upon the
grounds. for recusal, that avoid the appearance of partiality, and that maintain
public confidence in the people who comprise the judiciary.
